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Abstract 
The regulation of water services shares many similarities with that of other 
utilities such as electricity or telecommunications. As a result, similar methods 
are often used by regulators to assess the efficiency of companies in those 
sectors. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is one of those widely applied 
methods. This paper aims to determine the adequacy of DEA as a regulatory 
tool for urban water services, with a special focus on the quality of the available 
data. In order to obtain useful conclusions, two DEA simulations were 
performed with audited data from 194 water utilities, officially made available by 
the Portuguese water regulatory authority (ERSAR). Both simulations will 
demonstrate that the inherent inaccuracies found in some of the key data 
provided by water utilities represent a significant obstacle to obtain meaningful 
results with the DEA technique. This could represent a paradigm shift for some 
of the regulatory authorities currently using DEA or similar techniques, as the 
complexity of the method does not seem to be justified by a better analysis of 
the comparative performance of the different services.  
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1. Introduction 
Urban water services are usually provided in a natural monopoly market, for the 
entire demand in the supply area can be satisfied at a lowest cost by one firm 
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rather than by two or more (Posner, 1969). In the case of water services (like in 
most other public services described as natural monopolies), the key factor for 
this monopolistic environment is that a large fraction of the total costs consists 
of sunk capital costs (Joskow, 2007). In the case of water services, the capital 
costs correspond to the networks usually needed to deliver those services.  
 
Some authors consider that the natural monopoly is an economic fiction, and 
that the public utilities were in vigorous competition until government-sanctioned 
monopolies were granted (DiLorenzo, 1996). However, even considering this 
arguable contention to the natural monopoly concept, water has probably 
entered in a category of its own since the United Nations declared in 2010 safe 
and clean drinking water and sanitation a human right (United Nations, 2010).  
 
Regulation is the response of governments and public administration to protect 
the interests of the users in these natural monopolies. The Lisbon Charter (IWA, 
2015) lists among the responsibilities of regulatory authorities for water services 
to supervise tariffs, oversee and promote a suitable quality of service, ensure 
the protection of consumer rights, contribute to fair and open competition 
between service providers, collect analyse and disseminate accurate 
information and provide incentives for improvement of the services.  
 
Regulators have been addressing these responsibilities, at least in part, by 
collecting key data and calculating performance indicators to assess the 
performance of the different regulated services. Some of these regulators have 
collected, processed (and sometimes made public) this information to 
understand the performance of each operator, and used it in a qualitative 
manner to address their regulatory duties. 
 
However, other regulators (starting in the early 90s with OFWAT, the economic 
regulatory authority for England and Wales) decided to compare the 
performance of the different services in what was coined as “yardstick 
competition”. In the original reference, Shleifer (1985) defined it as “the 
simultaneous regulation of identical or similar firms. Under this scheme, the 
rewards of a given firm depend on its standing vis-à-vis a shadow firm, 
constructed from suitably averaging the choices of other firms in the group”. In 
the same paper, Shleifer presented the use of regression techniques to address 
the heterogeneity of the firms (in terms of context, and therefore of cost drivers). 
Shortly afterwards, yardstick competition became an integral part of the 
regulation scheme of OFWAT. However, even at this early stage, it was clear 
that the practical implementation of Shleifer theory was far from easy. Sawkins 
(1995) acknowledged these struggles: “In total then, even this very limited form 
of yardstick competition, imperfect and at an early stage of development, was 
delivering results”.  
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Following the leading steps of OFWAT, the world has witnessed in the past 20 
years many attempts of overcoming one of the difficulties originally outlined by 
Shleifer: the exogenous characteristics of utilities that drive costs. This issue 
has been addressed with models of increasing complexity, trying to determine 
the cost drivers and therefore establish a cost function that will enable to assess 
the degree of efficiency of a service.  
 
The literature presents a wealth of efficiency studies in the water sector using 
frontier models. Byrnes et al. (2010) for instance, use regulatory data in New 
South Wales and Victoria to determine the relative economic efficiency of 52 
water utilities. In their literature review, they cite 20 additional studies. Non-
parametric methods have also been widely employed to evaluate and compare 
the performance of water companies (Worthington, 2014). Within this approach, 
the most used method is data envelopment analysis (DEA) (Romano and 
Guerrini, 2011). Unlike parametric methods, DEA does not require to define the 
functional form of the production frontier (De Witte and Marques, 2010). 
 
DEA has been widely applied to evaluate the performance of water companies. 
However, DEA is a deterministic method and therefore cannot deal with 
imprecise data or provide information about uncertainty (Kao and Liu, 2014). 
This means that traditional DEA models (Charnes et al., 1978; Banker et al., 
1984) do not permit stochastic variations and uncertainty in data, and require 
that the exact values of all inputs and outputs are known. However, these 
assumptions may be faulty, since some data cannot be measured accurately 
enough in practice (Eslami et al., 2012). As a matter of fact, uncertainty 
naturally exists in data that are either collected, monitored or recorded in water 
services. 
 
To overcome this problem and to take uncertainty into account, several 
extensions to the traditional DEA models have been proposed, such as Monte 
Carlo simulation, the α-level based approach, chance constraint, bootstrapping, 
fuzzy ranking, and DEA-tolerance. In the case of water utilities, these 
methodologies have barely been used with the exception of De Witte and 
Marques (2010a) who applied orden-m method to incorporate environmental 
variables into water companies´ efficiency assessment and De Witte and 
Marques (2010b), Ananda (2014), See (2015) and Molinos-Senante et al. 
(2018) who employed a double-bootstrap DEA approach to compute bias-
corrected efficiency scores. Each of these methodological approaches has 
advantages and shortcomings. However, Bonilla et al. (2004) showed that the 
DEA-tolerance method is simpler and faster than the bootstrapping approach, 
and leads to similar results. Moreover, Dong et al. (2017) noted that the DEA-
tolerance approach is less subjective than the fuzzy approach since it does not 
need the fuzzy sets of variables to be defined for units. Furthermore, the DEA-
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tolerance approach can be combined with the system of indicators proposed by 
Boscá et al. (2011) that allows units to be benchmarked in an uncertain context. 
 
Given the nature of water services, the information in the water sector is quite 
poor. Most assets are buried underground and they may have been there for 
decades or even over a century. Water services are also more complex from a 
quality of service perspective (Cabrera & Cabrera Jr. 2016) and may require a 
greater number of variables to be taken into account. Some of those variables 
are not easy to measure accurately at a reasonable cost (e.g. flow rates, 
pressures…). Additionally, a significant portion of the delivered product (water) 
is lost through leaks, and the importance of this loss can only be estimated (and 
not measured). Remote sensing technologies are more complex to deploy for 
water services in comparison with the electricity or telecommunications 
services. The water industry is well aware of this limitation and both the ISO 
standards International Water Association strongly recommends to record the 
quality of input data in any performance assessment system (ISO 24510:2007, 
ISO 24511:2007, ISO 24512:2007, Alegre et al., 2016). 
 
In spite of data inaccuracy, most examples in the literature using DEA to 
evaluate the efficiency of water companies focus on the frontier model to be 
used, the input-output model or the variables to adopt as inputs or outputs 
without taking care of data uncertainty. Thus, data quality is seldom covered by 
DEA studies and the sensitivity of the methodology to poor data has not been 
studied in sufficient detail. This is surprising as data quality in the water industry 
is notoriously deficient (Alegre et al., 2016).  
 
This paper aims to determine whether the quality of data available in the water 
industry (and its uncertainty) suffices to obtain meaningful conclusions when 
trying to compare the efficiency of different operators using DEA. In order to do 
so, the technique has been used with real data from 194 utilities from a 
regulated environment (Portugal, where ERSAR is the regulator). This dataset 
has a significant characteristic: for all data, and following ERSAR’s 
requirements, all utilities recorded the uncertainty associated with each 
individual number. The data figures and their uncertainty can be considered 
reliable, as ERSAR audits all data submissions from utilities.  
 
2. Methodology 
The role of uncertainty of data in DEA models is essential, because the 
conclusions derived from performance analyses are highly sensitive to errors in 
data (Bhardwaj et al., 2018). To integrate uncertainty in performance 
assessment of water companies, the DEA-tolerance methodology was applied. 
Unlike traditional DEA models, the DEA-tolerance approach captures 
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uncertainty by constructing intervals for data (Dyson and Shale, 2010). Thus, it 
provides information on how sensitive water companies are to performance, 
with respect to changes in inputs and outputs by considering several scenarios 
for each water company.  
 
The definition of the tolerance values for inputs and outputs is an essential step 
in applying the DEA-tolerance model. In this case study, tolerances for each 
water company and variable were based on the degree of uncertainty declared 
by water companies themselves for every single variable (see Section 3 for 
additional information). Thus, asymmetric and variable tolerances were defined 
for each piece of data. 
 
Given 𝑘𝑘 = 1,2 … ,𝑛𝑛, water companies with each one using a vector of 𝑀𝑀 inputs 
𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 = (𝑥𝑥1𝑘𝑘 , 𝑥𝑥2𝑘𝑘, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘) to produce a vector of 𝑆𝑆 outputs 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 = (𝑦𝑦1𝑘𝑘 ,𝑦𝑦2𝑘𝑘, … ,𝑦𝑦𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘), 
the tolerances defined are non-negative scalar values and express the positive 
and negative changes in the values of the inputs and outputs as follows: 
Tolerance for inputs: 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 and 𝛼𝛼´𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘    
               (1) 
 




𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘, 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘, and 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘 are percentages of negative and positive deviation from the 
original values for inputs and outputs, and may range from [0 − 100]. 
According to the tolerance values defined, the values of the inputs and outputs 
should be within the following range: 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘  ∈  [𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 + 𝛼𝛼´𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 ]                           (2) 
𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘  ∈  [𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘 − 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘 ,𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽´𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘 ] 
 
Equation (2) shows that there is a breadth of possible combinations of inputs 
and outputs. Thus, scenarios in which the performance indexes are computed 
should be selected. Following Molinos-Senante et al. (2016), 81 scenarios were 
simulated for each water company which allowed the maximum (best case) and 
minimum (worst case) performance index to be obtained, in addition to the 
original and mean values. These 81 scenarios result from calculating 34 
alternatives, corresponding to three situations for each utility: i) favorable; ii) 
unfavorable, and iii) original, with four possible input and output sets for each 
one of them: i) inputs for the analysed Decision Making Unit (DMU); ii) outputs 
for the analysed DMU; iii) inputs for the remaining DMUs, and iv) outputs for the 
remaining DMUs. The best-case scenario (the best for the water company 
evaluated) involves considering the lowest values for inputs and the highest 
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values for outputs. By contrast, the worst-case scenario involves the opposite 
situation. 
 
Once tolerance values were defined, performance indexes were calculated for 
each water company for all 81 scenarios. Following previous studies (Marques 
et al., 2014; Guerrini et al., 2015; Molinos-Senante et al., 2016), a DEA 
approach based on assumptions of variable returns to scale (VRS) and 
minimization orientation (Wang et al., 2012) (Eq. (3)) was employed to compute 
a performance index for each water company evaluated. The measure of 
performance 𝜃𝜃 is obtained, according to the DEA-VRS model, by solving the 
following linear programming problem for each water company 𝑘𝑘0, for each of 
the 81 defined scenarios: 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛  𝜃𝜃   
𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡. 
∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 ≤𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘=1 𝜃𝜃𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘0                                       1 ≤ 𝑀𝑀 ≤ 𝑀𝑀    
∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘 ≥𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘=1 𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘0                                         1 ≤ 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑆𝑆     (3) 
∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 = 1𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘=1   
𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 ≥ 0                                                              1 ≤ 𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝑛𝑛 
 
where 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 is a vector of intensity. The measure of performance 𝜃𝜃 ranges 
between 0 and 1. A water company is considered efficient if 𝜃𝜃 = 1, since it 
means that the water company is located on the efficient frontier. In contrast, an 
efficiency lower than 1 indicates that the performance of the company can 
improve and that the utility is therefore inefficient. 
 
Under the best and worst-case scenarios, the maximum and minimum 
performance indexes were obtained for each water company evaluated, 
allowing analysing the impact of data uncertainty on the performance of water 
companies. 
 
3. Sample description 
The described methodology was applied to a dataset collected by the 
Portuguese Water and Waste Services Regulation Authority (ERSAR) in 2015 
(ERSAR, 2015). The selection of the data was motivated by several reasons. In 
first place, all data variables were accompanied by an uncertainty value and all 
data and uncertainty values provided by the utilities were audited by ERSAR. 
Secondly, data are publicly available through the ERSAR website. Finally, 
ERSAR was considered to be a reliable source of data, with over 15 years of 
experience in data collection and publication of results (ERSAR, 2017), and a 
reputation as a regulator of excellence.  
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The DEA model used was designed to estimate the efficiency of water supply 
services. For this reason, utilities providing water supply services were selected 
from the ERSAR database (including multi-utilities), excluding those that solely 
provide wastewater or solid waste services. For this reason, special care was 
taken in the selection of variables in order to avoid the use variables that might 
be influenced by performance of the other services.  
 
It is of great importance when assessing the efficiency of water supply utilities to 
consider the quality of service provided. Maintaining a high quality of the service 
has a clear impact on costs (Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2008) and, in consequence, 
efficiency results may be significantly biased if quality of service is not 
considered. Quality of service has been traditionally omitted from the efficiency 
models, as a deep analysis of most of the frontier efficiency models published 
applied to the water sector proves (Ferro et al., 2014; Walter et al., 2009). Even 
though the sector is slowly becoming aware of the impact that quality of service 
has on results (Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2008; Molinos-Senante et al., 2016; Pinto 
et al., 2016) a standard procedure has not been defined yet to consider it in 
frontier efficiency methods. In this research, quality of service influences both 
inputs and outputs. 
 
All variables used as inputs and outputs in the DEA model are defined in detail 
in the ERSAR technical guides (ERSAR 2011). Following previous studies 
(See, 2015), the model considers four inputs: network length (km), total 
expenses (€/year), volume of real water losses (m3/year) and service 
interruptions (number/year). The last two inputs provide information on the 
quality of service. Water companies should minimize both variables to provide 
high-quality service and therefore, they were integrated in the model as inputs.  
 
Total expenses were used instead of using operating and labour costs, which 
are variables typically considered in the water sector (Ferro et al. 2014). Total 
expenses include capital and operating expenses. This variable have not been 
extensively used for frontier efficiency methods in the water sector due to the 
disparity in the valuation of the capital expenses. However, in this study they 
can be included as inputs due to the fact that the sample belongs to a regulated 
environment and all utilities use the same definition for their calculation.  
 
The selected outputs were: volume of produced water (m3/year) and number of 
households covered by the water service (No.). Both variables have been 
widely used in frontier efficiency studies as outputs (Ferro et al., 2014; Abbott & 
Cohen, 2009). 
 
Concerning the number of utilities, from the 265 utilities providing water services 
in the ERSAR database, only those reporting uncertainty information for all 
variables used as inputs/outputs in the DEA model were considered. As a 
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consequence, only 194 were considered as DMUs in the efficiency model, 
discarding the remaining 70 due to incomplete data quality information.  
 
The number of DMUs can be a limitation in a DEA model. A minimum number 
of DMUs is needed and this number is determined by the amount of inputs and 
outputs considered (Tupper & Resende 2004). This number can be calculated 
with “Cooper’s rule”: the number of DMUs to be evaluated in the model must be 
equal or larger than max{𝑚𝑚 × 𝑠𝑠; 3(𝑚𝑚 + 𝑠𝑠)} where m is the number of inputs and 
s the number of outputs (Cooper et al. 2011). In this study, the 194 DMUs 
considered exceed by far the requested minimum number. 
 
In the water sector, with the entire infrastructure buried and a significant amount 
of data estimated, reliable and accurate data is hard to find. For instance, 
considering  water volumes, the error of a water meter can range, depending on 
the technology, between 0.2% and 5% (Arregui et al., 2007). However, these 
values are only valid for new, calibrated, properly installed and appropriately 
selected water meters (working in their designed flow rate range) (Arregui et al., 
2007). These values increase with water meters not complying with these 
specifications and far larger errors can be found when volumes are estimated 
(unmetered consumption, real losses and commercial losses). 
 
Data quality in the considered dataset was taken into account by means of 
uncertainty bands. These uncertainty bands reflect the confidence grade of the 
values submitted by the utility and were audited by ERSAR. Uncertainty was 
considered in 6 discrete bands (ERSAR, 2011). Table 1 displays the uncertainty 
bands considered.  
 
The uncertainty associated to each input or output is different for each variable 
and utility. For instance, for service interruptions output, utility A can have an 
uncertainty band of 0-5% as they have an updated digital record system. Utility 
B uncertainty, ranges between 20-50% if they have a non-updated recording 
system in paper format.  
 
3.1. Uncertainty band analysis  
The number of utilities with data in each uncertainty band was analysed for both 
inputs and outputs. Results are summarized in Table 1. The most accurate 
variables, are volume of water produced and number of households with water 
service. 
 
In the case of the volume of water produced, this volume is usually metered 
after the water treatment plant (WTP) with a bulk meter. Uncertainty in this case 
is driven by the accuracy of the metering system used, the age of the meter and 
whether it has been appropriately selected and calibrated. Optimum values 
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belong to the 0-5% band (Arregui et al., 2007; ISO 4064-1, 2014) and values 
out of this range would correspond to older, non-calibrated or not appropriately 
selected meters and for non-metered volumes (estimated by the utility). The 
Number of households with water service variable also presents lower 
uncertainties as this value is generally accurately known through to the billing 
system. 
 
Knowledge of the network length is far less accurate. The main sources of 
inaccuracies in this value derive from the networks’ age, the lack of proper 
records for network extensions in new urban developments and diversity of 
sources. Even though the average uncertainty is higher than in previous 
variables, it is maintained within reasonable levels. 
 
Moving to total expenses, this is the second variable with fewer utilities in the 0-
5% band. This higher uncertainty derives from the fact that some utilities did not 
have appropriate costing systems at the time the data were collected. 
 
Finally, volume of water losses and number of interruptions present high levels 
of uncertainty. The volume of water losses is obtained from the water balance, 
with significant uncertainties potentially associated to measured volumes, with 
some estimated volumes also being part of the calculation.  
 
Regarding the number of interruptions, 92% of values are located in the 0-20% 
uncertainty band. This value entirely depends on how utilities are able to record 
interruptions and their significant related data. In a regulated environment, this 
value should be quite accurate.  
 


















0 - 5% 133 85 147 83  175 166 
5 - 20% 45 60 31 69  15 17 
20 - 50% 11 34 5 28  2 6 
50 - 100% 5 8 9 11  1 5 
100 - 
300% 0 7 0 2 
 1 0 
> 300% 0 0 2 1  0 0 
 
4. Results and discussion 
81 DEA simulation were performed for the entire sample of 194 utilities. Figure 
1 represents the range of results for each utility. The DEA simulation with the 
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original data submitted to the regulator are represented in this figure by the 
series labelled as “Original” which is characterized by a square. Utilities are 
ordered by the original efficiency, as shown by the positive slope of this series. 
The maximum efficiency for each utility in the 81 simulations (its best result 
taking into account uncertainty in data) is represented by a triangle and is 
named “Max”. The minimum efficiency (worst result out of all scenarios) is 
represented by the circle and labelled as “Min”. 
 
The vertical lines represent the efficiency amplitude (maximum-minimum 
efficiency score) obtained by each utility. In other words, the gap between the 
best and worst efficiencies estimated by the DEA simulation. The discrepancies 
in the results are very significant, and the average change in efficiency for the 
sample is 71%, with a maximum of 97% for one of the utilities. This result 
evidences the importance of data uncertainty in efficiency assessment of water 
companies. 
 
This variability in results is derived from the uncertainty of input and output data 
declared by the utilities themselves and audited by the regulator. This amplitude 
is difficult to rationalize, as a 71% amplitude can turn an efficient utility, sitting at 
the frontier (those with a triangle at the top line, with an efficiency score of 1) 
into an inefficient one (0.29 efficiency score, or a 29% efficiency).  
 
It is very important to note that these 81 scenarios do not correspond to 
possible alternatives in external or internal events or conditions, and simply 
address the inaccuracies of records or measuring devices. In other words, they 
all correspond to the current reality. An audited reality. 
 




Efficient utilities are those with an efficiency score of 1. In the simulation with 
the original submitted data, 34 utilities (17.5%) are fully efficient. These efficient 
utilities conform the frontier and represent the benchmark for the remaining 
utilities.  
 
In the scenario with fewer utilities at the frontier, only 3 of them reach a score of 
1, while in the scenario with a higher number of efficient utilities, 110 utilities 
conform the frontier. Considering these results, a regulator would have a very 
hard time separating the efficient competitors from those who are not using only 
these data and method.  
 
DEA is often used to rank utilities against each other creating yardstick 
competition. The relative position of the utility in the ranking is used to trigger 
regulatory measures such as penalties, incentives, tariff increases, etc. In order 
to determine how data quality affected the relative position of utilities in a 
yardstick competition situation, the position in the ranking for each utility in all 
81 simulations was obtained. The most efficient utilities are ranked at the top, 
while the last positions represent low efficiency.  
 
Table 2 shows the variability of the ranking using four individual utilities 
(numbers 24, 106, 112 and 163) and five different DEA simulations (out of the 
81), including the Original DEA simulation. The entire ranking is available as 
additional data for this paper.  
 
Once again, the use of the results for regulatory purposes becomes impossible. 
Depending on the considered simulation (all within the uncertainties submitted 
by the utilities), the top utility in the original simulation (number 163) can go as 
low in the ranking as position 184. All four utilities are subject to changes in their 
ranking (depending on the combinations of possible data) of up to 192 positions 
(utility 106 experiments the smaller variation of the four, with 95 positions). 
 















24 193 1 192 63 130 1 192 40 153 
106 68 1 67 103 -35 107 -39 163 -95 
112 116 1 115 177 -61 140 -24 134 -18 
163 1 1 0 76 -75 103 -102 184 -183 




While not all of the utilities experiment these dramatic changes, the robustness 
of the ranking (taking into account the quality of the data) is extremely weak and 
could easily be disputed by any of the regulated companies. The variability in 
the ranking has been summarized in Figure 2. This histogram shows utility 
groups according to the percentage of variation in their ranking (expressed as 
the positions changed with respect to the total number of companies). Only 2% 
of utilities maintain their position in all 81 DEA simulations, and only a 4% vary 
their position less than a 10%. However, around 60% of utilities see how their 
position in the ranking changes more than a 50%. Furthermore, there is an 8% 
of utilities varying their position more than a 90%. 
 
Figure 2: Maximum variation in the ranking expressed in % for all utilities 
 
 
This kind of variability would have a critical impact in a regulatory environment, 
as the consequences faced by a utility would change widely from being in the 
frontier (and therefore be considered a benchmark) or being in the last positions 
of the ranking. From a regulatory perspective, this kind of error in the 
assessment is serious enough to render any potential conclusions meaningless. 
After all, these relative positions are used in a yardstick competition 
environment to support key decisions affecting the economic part of the 
regulation.  
 
Once again, it must be stressed that this variability is not a consequence of the 
utility modifying its performance or the context changing. They are simply 
reflecting the uncertainty in the data provided by the utilities, an uncertainty 
declared by the utilities as part of their data submission and subject to auditing 
from the regulator.  
 
Considering the severe conclusions that may be drawn from the preceding 
results, some further consideration on the data used may be necessary. As 
presented when discussing the sample, the 194 utilities are already a subset of 
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the 265 utilities reported by ERSAR; specifically, those that reported data 
quality information for all variables. However, a regulator must consider all 
regulated utilities in its region of mandate. Additionally, it must be reminded that 
since ERSAR is one of the few regulators requiring utilities to provide data 
quality information, we consider that regulated utilities in Portugal are sensitive 
to the need to produce good quality data (especially since all data are subject to 
audit by the regulator). This leads us to believe that the data quality of this 
particular set (European country, regulated, data quality reported and audited) 
can be considered to be good, or better than average.   
 
However, in order to reinforce the conclusions, a second DEA simulation was 
run with a smaller cluster of utilities. The DMUs considered in this simulation 
were a subset of 108 utilities with uncertainties lower than 20% in all variables 
considered. In other words, the top 40% utilities (regarding the quality of their 
data). This simulation has been labelled as “Reduced sample”. 
 
Figure 3 summarizes the results of the reduced sample simulation. As 
expected, the average amplitude has been reduced to a 17.40%. However, the 
maximum amplitude is still very large, 43%. These results, although better than 
the ones obtained in the complete sample simulation, are still far from producing 
reliable conclusions.  
 
It can be deduced when comparing the complete simulation and the reduced 
sample simulation that DEA is a sensitive method when high uncertainties are 
considered. When the worst performers in terms of data quality have been 
removed from the sample, amplitude of range has decreased substantially. 
 




Respecting the number of efficient utilities, there are 18 efficient utilities in the 
Original simulation (without considering uncertainties). However, this value 
increases to 25 in the best scenario (7 utilities become efficient), and decreases 
to 12 in the worst scenario (6 utilities from the original scenario are declassified 
as efficient).  
 
Table 3 shows an example of how the ranking vary in four different DEA 
simulations and four utilities. Comparing with the complete sample simulation, 
variation in ranking has decreased substantially. However, it is still significant. 
For instance, utility 53 varies from being in position 34 in the original DEA 
simulation to become efficient in another simulation.  
 















32 1 20 -19 1 0 20 -19 1 0 
42 94 95 -1 72 22 96 -2 79 15 
53 34 48 -14 24 10 50 -16 1 33 
55 58 73 -15 52 6 78 -20 37 21 
ΔPosition is the difference between the Original DEA ranking position and the ranking of the considered 
simulation. 
 
Figure 4 summarizes the variability in the ranking in the reduced sample 
simulation. In this case, an 84% of utilities vary their position between 0 and 
10%. From them, only an 11% maintain their position and a 30% vary between 
0 and 5%. However, there is still a 16% of utilities varying their position in the 
ranking between a 10 and a 25%. 
 




As can be deduced from the presented results, uncertainties have an important 
impact on DEA results. The conclusions obtained when ignoring data quality, 
have shown little consistency once the potential variability of real data is 
considered.  
 
The method shows greater consistency when better data are used. However, 
poor data quality is inherent to the water sector. Improving quality of data can 
require a significant amount of resources and a regulator can only promote 
better data quality, but not guarantee it.  
 
Finally, this study shows that data quality needs to be considered an integral 
part of data collection for regulation. The validity of any method can only be 
tested if data quality information is collected and audited. Doing otherwise can 
only lead to doubtful conclusions when assessing the performance of competing 
utilities in a regulated environment.  
5. Conclusions 
Water services are usually provided in a natural monopoly market that requires 
to be regulated. It is the role of the regulator to guarantee that users are able to 
access services of a suitable quality, while their rights as consumers are 
protected with reasonable tariffs and a fair and open competition between 
service providers. Additionally information needs to be collected and presented 
in a transparent way. 
 
Yardstick competition, as acknowledged since its inception, requires to model 
costs to eliminate context. DEA is the most popular of the non-parametric 
frontier methods used to assess efficiency, and as such has been extensively 
discussed and used for regulatory purposes. Until now, despite 
recommendations found in ISO standards (ISO 24510:2007, ISO 24511:2007, 
ISO 24512:2007) and the IWA manuals of best practices, data quality has not 
been a significant part of the discussion in regulation, especially when 
determining how suitable a method was to model costs or assess efficiency. 
 
This paper presented a study to determine how sensitive DEA results are to the 
uncertainties that are inherently present in water sector data. Using public, 
audited data from a regulated environment, the results show that DEA is very 
sensitive to data quality and presents very inconclusive results when several 
scenarios are considered with the potential variation that data may present due 
to its uncertainty. In a regulatory environment, with a yardstick competition 
approach, a significant portion of the utilities considered could experiment 
significant differences in their perceived efficiency depending on pure chance.  
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Given the nature and origin of the studied utilities, it may be concluded that this 
uncertainty and, hence, its impact in DEA results, could be virtually extrapolated 
to any country in the world. DEA would work better with better quality of data, 
but the data quality for the whole sector in any other country can hardly be 
expected to be better than the uncertainty declared by the top utilities in 
Portugal. 
 
Consequently, further research is needed to incorporate data quality in cost 
modelling and efficiency assessment. It remains to be seen if, with the adequate 
amendments, DEA will be an adequate methodology to assess comparative 
efficiency in the water sector with the quality of the currently available data.    
 
In any case, based on the results of this study, it would be advisable for policy 
makers and regulators of water services to consider data quality as a 
substantial component of their efforts to assess efficiency. Such information 
should be used to carry out sensitivity analyses similar to the one presented 
here. This would prevent making critical regulatory decisions based on 
methodologies that could present significant uncertainties derived from poor 
data quality.  
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